Abstract-Many decentralized and networked control problems involve decision makers which have either misaligned criteria or subjective priors. In the context of such a setup, in this paper we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver) have subjective priors and/or misaligned objective functions. Depending on the commitment nature of the transmitter to his policies, we formulate the binary signaling problem as a Bayesian game under either Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium concepts and establish equilibrium solutions and their properties. In addition, the effects of inconsistent priors and costs on Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are analyzed. It is shown that there can be informative or non-informative equilibria in the binary signaling game under the Stackelberg assumption, but there always exists an equilibrium. However, apart from the informative and non-informative equilibria cases, under certain conditions, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium when the receiver is restricted to use deterministic policies. For the corresponding team setup, however, an equilibrium typically always exists and is always informative. Furthermore, we show that as the inconsistency of the priors diminishes, the convergence to the team setup is attained for the Stackelberg case, whereas this may not be the case under the Nash setup.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many decentralized and networked control problems, decision makers have either misaligned criteria or have subjective priors, which necessitates solution concepts from game theory. For example, detecting attacks, anomalies, and malicious behavior with regard to security in networked control systems can be analyzed under a game theoretic perspective, see e.g., [1] - [10] .
In this paper, we consider signaling games that refer to a class of two-player games of incomplete information in which an informed decision maker (transmitter or encoder) transmits information to another decision maker (receiver or decoder) in the hypothesis testing context. In the following, we first provide the preliminaries and introduce the problems considered in the paper, and present the related literature briefly.
A. Preliminaries
Consider a binary hypothesis-testing problem: 
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where Y is the observation (measurement) that belongs to observation set Γ = R, S 0 and S 1 denote the deterministic signals under hypothesis H 0 and hypothesis H 1 , respectively, and N represents a Gaussian noise; i.e., N ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). In the Bayesian setup, it is assumed that the prior probabilities of H 0 and H 1 are available, which are denoted by π 0 and π 1 , respectively, with π 0 + π 1 = 1.
In the conventional Bayesian framework, the aim of the receiver is to design the optimal decision rule (detector) based on Y in order to minimize the Bayes risk, which is defined as [11] r(δ) = π 0 R 0 (δ) + π 1 R 1 (δ) ,
where δ(·) is the decision rule, and R i (·) is the conditional risk of the decision rule when hypothesis H i is true for i ∈ {0, 1}. In general, a decision rule corresponds to a partition of the observation set Γ into two subsets Γ 0 and Γ 1 , and the decision becomes H i if the observation y belongs to H i , where i ∈ {0, 1}.
The conditional risks in (1) can be calculated as
for i ∈ {0, 1}, where C ji ≥ 0 is the cost of deciding for H j when H i is true, and P ji = P(Y ∈ Γ j |H i ) represents the conditional probability of deciding for H j given that H i is true, where i, j ∈ {0, 1} [11] . It is well-known that the optimal decision rule δ that minimizes the Bayes risk is the following likelihood ratio test (LRT):
where p i (y) represents the probability density function (PDF) of Y under H i , where i ∈ {0, 1} [11] . If the transmitter and the receiver have the same objective function specified by (1) and (2) , then the signals can be designed to minimize the Bayes risk corresponding to the decision rule in (3) . This leads to a conventional formulation which has been studied intensely in the literature [11] , [12] . On the other hand, in order to reflect the different perspectives of the players, the transmitter and the receiver can have non-aligned Bayes risks. In particular, let C t ji and C r ji represent the cost values from the perspective of the transmitter and the receiver, respectively, where i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Also let π t i and π r i for i ∈ {0, 1} denote the priors from the perspective of the transmitter and the receiver, respectively, with π j 0 + π j 1 = 1, where j ∈ {t, r}. Here, from transmitter's and receiver's perspectives, the priors must be mutually absolutely continuous with respect to each other; i.e., π
. This condition assures that the impossibility of any hypothesis holds for both the transmitter and the receiver simultaneously. The aim of the transmitter is to perform the optimal design of signals S = {S 0 , S 1 } to minimize his Bayes risk; whereas, the aim of the receiver is to determine the optimal decision rule δ over all possible decision rules ∆ to minimize his Bayes risk.
The Bayes risks are defined as follows for the transmitter and the receiver:
where
for i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {t, r}. Here, the transmitter performs the optimal signal design problem under the power constraint below:
where P 0 and P 1 denote the power limits.
In the simultaneous-move game, the encoder and the decoder announce their policies at the same time, and a pair of policies (S * , δ * ) is said to be a Nash equilibrium [13] if
As noted from the definition in (4), under the Nash equilibrium, each individual player chooses an optimal strategy given the strategies chosen by the other players. However, in the leader-follower game, the leader (encoder) commits to and announces his optimal policy before the follower (decoder) does, and the follower observes what the leader is committed to before choosing and announcing his optimal policy. Then, a pair of policies (S * , δ * ) is said to be a Stackelberg equilibrium [13] if
As observed from the definition in (5), the decoder takes his optimal action δ * (S) after observing the policy of the encoder S. Further, in the Stackelberg game, the leader cannot backtrack on his commitment, and he has a leadership advantage since he can manipulate the follower by anticipating follower's actions.
In game theory, Nash (simultaneous game-play) and Stackelberg (sequential game-play) equilibria are drastically different concepts. Both equilibrium concepts find applications depending on the assumptions on the transmitter in view of the commitment conditions. As discussed in [14] , [15] , in the Nash equilibrium case, building on [16] , equilibrium properties possess different characteristics as compared to team problems; whereas for the Stackelberg case, the leader agent is restricted to be committed to his announced policy which leads to similarities with team problem setups [17] - [19] . Since there is no such commitment in the Nash setup; the perturbation in the encoder does not lead to a functional perturbation in decoder's policy, unlike the Stackelberg setup. However, in the context of binary signaling, we will see that the distinction is not as sharp as it is in the case of quadratic signaling games [14] , [15] .
If an equilibrium is achieved when S * is non-informative (e.g., S 0 = S 1 ) and δ * uses only the priors (since the received message is useless), then we call such an equilibrium a noninformative (babbling) equilibrium.
B. Related Literature
Standard binary hypothesis testing has been extensively studied over several decades under different setups [11] , [12] , which can also be viewed as a decentralized control/team problem among an encoder and a decoder who wish to minimize a common cost criterion. However, there exist many scenarios in which the analysis falls within the scope of game theory; either because the goals of the decision makers are misaligned, or because the probabilistic model of the system is not common knowledge among the decision makers. For example, detecting attacks, anomalies, and malicious behavior in network security can be analyzed under the game theoretic perspective [1] - [5] . In this direction, the hypothesis testing and the game theory approaches can be utilized together to investigate attacker-defender type applications [6] - [10] , multimedia source identification problems [20] , and inspection games [21] - [23] .
In particular, the binary signaling problem investigated here can be motivated under different application contexts: inconsistent priors and the presence of a bias in the transmitter cost function when compared with that of the receiver. The former one, decentralized stochastic control with inconsistent priors, has been studied extensively in the literature [24] - [26] . In this setup, players have a common goal but inconsistent prior information, which necessarily alters the setup from a team problem to a game problem. The latter one is the adaptation of the biased cost function of the transmitter in [16] to the binary signaling problem considered here. We discuss these further in the following.
C. Two Motivating Setups
We will presenting two different scenarios that fit into the binary signaling context discussed here and revisit these setups throughout the paper.
1) Inconsistent Priors:
Suppose that only the beliefs of the transmitter and the receiver about the prior probabilities of hypothesis H 0 and H 1 differ, and the cost values from the perspective of the transmitter and the receiver are the same. Namely, from transmitter's perspective, the priors are π The setups in decentralized decision making where the priors of the decision makers may be different is an intensely researched area: Among these, [25] and [26] study decentralized decision making with inconsistent priors, and [24] investigates optimal decentralized decision making where the nature of subjective priors converts a team problem into a game problem (see [27, Section 12.2.3] for a comprehensive literature review on inconsistent priors also from a statistical decision making perspective).
2) Biased Transmitter Cost Function: Consider a binary signaling game in which the transmitter encodes a random binary signal x = i as H i by choosing the corresponding signal level S i for i ∈ {0, 1}, and the receiver decodes the received signal y as u = δ(y). Let the priors from the perspectives of the transmitter and the receiver be the same; i.e., π i = π t i = π r i for i ∈ {0, 1}, and the Bayes risks of the transmitter and the receiver be defined as
, respectively, where 1 {D} denotes the indicator function of an event D, ⊕ stands for the exclusive-or operator and b is the random binary bias term, so that the structure of the costs (Bayes risks) resemble the ones in [16] (as also studied in [14] , [15] ). Also let α Pr(b = 0) = 1 − Pr(b = 1); i.e., the probability that the cost functions of the transmitter and the receiver are aligned. The following relations can be observed: 
D. Contributions
The main contributions of this study can be summarized as follows: 1) A game theoretic formulation of the binary signaling problem is proposed under subjective priors and/or subjective costs. 2) Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium policies are obtained and their properties (such as uniqueness and informativeness) are investigated.
a) It is proved that an equilibrium is almost always informative for a team setup (practically, 0 < τ < 1), whereas in the case of inconsistent priors and/or costs, it may cease to be informative. b) It is shown that Stackelberg equilibria always exist, whereas there are setups under which Nash equilibria may not exist.
3) Robustness of equilibrium solutions are established under certain conditions when the priors or costs converge to one another, and the team optimal solutions are recovered.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The team setup, the Stackelberg setup, and the Nash setup of the binary signaling game are investigated in Sections II, Section III, and Section IV, respectively. Section V concludes the paper.
II. TEAM SETUP ANALYSIS
Now consider the team setup where the cost parameters and the priors are assumed to be same for both the transmitter and the receiver; i.e., C ji = C for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. Thus the common Bayes risk becomes r t (S, δ) = r r (S, δ) = π 0 (C 00 P 00 + C 10 P 10 ) + π 1 (C 01 P 01 + C 11 P 11 ). The arguments for the proof of the following result follow from the standard analysis in the detection and estimation literature [11] , [12] . However, for completeness, and for the ease of the analysis in the following sections, a proof is included.
Theorem 2.1: Let τ π0(C10−C00) π1(C01−C11) . If τ ≤ 0 or τ = ∞, then the team solution of the binary signaling setup is noninformative. Otherwise; i.e., if 0 < τ < ∞, the team solution is always informative.
Proof: The players adjust S 0 , S 1 , and δ so that r t (S, δ) = r r (S, δ) is minimized. The Bayes risk of the transmitter and the receiver can be written as follows 1 :
for j ∈ {t, r}.
Here, first the receiver chooses the optimal decision rule δ * S0,S1 for any given signal levels S 0 and S 1 , and then the transmitter chooses the optimal signal levels S * 0 and S * 1 depending on the optimal receiver policy δ * S0,S1 . Let the transmitter choose optimal signals S = {S 0 , S 1 }. Assuming non-zero priors π 
In the above likelihood ratio test (7), the equilibrium is non-informative for τ ≤ 0 or τ = ∞ since the receiver may choose always H 0 or always H 1 , or the receiver is indifferent of deciding between H 0 and H 1 . Therefore, it can be assumed that 0 < τ < ∞. Then, from (7), the conditional probabilities can be written as follows:
, then the optimum behavior of the transmitter can be found by analyzing the derivative of the Bayes risk of the transmitter in (6) with respect to d:
In (8), if we utilize
< 0, as expected [11] . Thus, in order to minimize the Bayes risk, the transmitter always prefers the maximum d, i.e., d
, and the equilibrium is informative.
III. STACKELBERG GAME ANALYSIS
Under the Stackelberg assumption, first the transmitter (the leader agent) announces and commits to a particular policy, and then the receiver (the follower agent) acts accordingly. In this direction, first the transmitter chooses optimal signals S = {S 0 , S 1 } to minimize his Bayes risk r t (S, δ), then the receiver chooses an optimal decision rule δ accordingly to minimize his Bayes risk r r (S, δ). Due to the sequential structure of the Stackelberg game, the encoder knows the priors and the cost parameters of the decoder so that he can adjust his optimal policy accordingly. On the other hand, the decoder knows only the policy of the encoder as he announces during the game-play. Under such a gameplay assumption, the equilibrium structure of the Stackelberg binary signaling game can be characterized as follows: 
If τ ≤ 0 or τ = ∞, then the Stackelberg equilibrium of the binary signaling game is non-informative. Otherwise; i.e., if 0 < τ < ∞, the Stackelberg equilibrium structure can be characterized as in Table I , where d * = 0 stands for a noninformative equilibrium, and a nonzero d * corresponds to an informative equilibrium.
Before proving Theorem 3.1, we make the following remark: Remark 3.1: As we observed in Theorem 2.1, for a team setup, an equilibrium is almost always informative (practically, 0 < τ < ∞), whereas in the case of inconsistent priors and/or costs, it may cease to be informative.
Proof: By applying the same approach as in Theorem 2.1, it can be deduced that the equilibrium is noninformative if τ ≤ 0 or τ = ∞. Thus, 0 < τ < ∞ can be assumed. Then, from (8) 
Therefore, one of the following cases is applicable:
is satisfied ∀d, which means that r t (S, δ) is a monotone decreasing function of d. Therefore, the transmitter tries to maximize d; i.e., chooses the maximum of |S 1 − S 0 | under the constraints S 0 2 ≤ P 0 and S 1 2 ≤ P 1 , hence
, then r t (S, δ) is a monotone decreasing function of d. Therefore, the transmitter maximizes d as in the previous case.
, r t (S, δ) is first decreasing and then increasing with respect to d. Therefore, the transmitter chooses the optimal d
which results in a minimal Bayes risk r t (S, δ) for the transmitter. This can be observed in Figure 1 .
is satisfied ∀d, which means that r t (S, δ) is a monotone increasing function of d. Therefore, the transmitter tries to minimize d; i.e., chooses S 0 = S 1 so that d * = 0. In this case, the transmitter does not provide any information to the receiver and the decision rule of the receiver becomes δ(y) : 1 H1 H0 τ ; i.e., the receiver uses only the prior information, thus the equilibrium is non-informative.
, then r t (S, δ) is a monotone increasing function of d. Therefore, the transmitter chooses S 0 = S 1 so that d * = 0. Similar to the previous case, the equilibrium is non-informative.
, r t (S, δ) is first an increasing then a decreasing function of d, which makes the transmitter choose either the minimum d or the maximum d; i.e., he chooses the one that results in a lower Bayes risk r t (S, δ) for the transmitter. If the minimum Bayes risk is achieved when d * = 0, then the equilibrium is noninformative; otherwise (i.e., when the minimum Bayes risk is achieved when d * = d max ), the equilibrium is an informative one. The comparison of the transmitter Bayes risks for d = 0 and d = d max reduces to the following rule: 
The most interesting case is Case-3 in which ln τ
, since in all other cases, the transmitter chooses either the minimum or maximum distance between the signal levels. Further, for classical hypothesis-testing in the team setup, the optimal distance corresponds to maximum separation [11] . However, in Case-3, there is an optimal distance d * = 2 ln τ (k0−k1) (k0+k1)
< d max that makes the Bayes risk of the transmitter minimum as it can be seen in Figure 1 . After investigating the Stackelberg equilibrium structure of the binary signaling game, the convergence properties of Stackelberg and team setups can be stated as follows: Theorem 3.2: As the priors and the cost values from the perspective of the transmitter and the receiver converge to each other, the Stackelberg solution converges to the team solution.
Proof: Assume that the priors and the cost values from the perspective of the transmitter converge to the those of the receiver; i.e., C 
A. Motivating Examples

1)
Inconsistent Priors : Referring to Section I-C.1, the related parameters can be found as follows:
If 0 < τ < ∞, then k 0 + k 1 > 0, and depending on the values of ln τ
, and
, Case-1, Case-5 or Case-6 of Theorem 3.1 may hold as depicted in Table II . Otherwise; i.e., if τ ≤ 0 or τ = ∞, the equilibrium is non-informative. Here, the decision rule in Case-6 is the same as (9). 2) Biased Transmitter Cost Function : Based on the arguments in Section I-C.2, the related parameters can be found as follows:
; hence, either Case-4 or Case-6 of Theorem 3.1 applies. Namely, if α < 1/2 (Case-4 of Theorem 3.1 applies), the transmitter chooses S 0 = S 1 to minimize d and the equilibrium is non-informative. If α = 1/2, the transmitter has no control on his Bayes risk, hence the equilibrium is non-informative. Otherwise; i.e., if α > 1/2 (Case-6 of Theorem 3.1 applies), the equilibrium is always informative. In other words, if α > 1/2, the players act like a team.
IV. NASH GAME ANALYSIS
Under the Nash assumption, both the transmitter chooses optimal signals S = {S 0 , S 1 } to minimize r t (S, δ), and the receiver chooses optimal decision rule δ to minimize r r (S, δ) simultaneously. In this Nash setup, the encoder and the decoder do not know the priors and the cost parameters of each other; they know only their policies as they announce to each other. Further, there is no commitment between the transmitter and the receiver; hence, the perturbation in 
the encoder does not lead to a functional perturbation in decoder's policy, unlike the Stackelberg setup. Due to this drastic difference, the equilibrium structure and convergence properties of the Nash equilibrium show significant differences from the ones in the Stackelberg equilibrium, as stated in the following theorem:
. If τ ≤ 0 or τ = ∞, then the Nash equilibrium of the binary signaling game is non-informative. Otherwise; i.e., if 0 < τ < ∞, the Nash equilibrium structure is as depicted in Table III .
Proof: Let the transmitter choose any signals S = {S 0 , S 1 }. Assuming nonzero priors π t 0 , π r 0 , π t 1 and π r 1 , the optimal decision for the receiver is (7). Similar to the team case analysis in Theorem 2.1, the equilibrium is noninformative if τ ≤ 0 or τ = ∞; thus, 0 < τ < ∞ can be assumed. Then, the possible cases can be summarized as follows:
2) If S 0 = S 1 , the receiver applies δ(y) : 1
H1
H0
τ .
3) If S 0 > S 1 , the receiver applies δ(y) : y
2 . Now assume that the receiver applies a simple threshold rule δ : y H1 H0 η. Then, the conditional probabilities are
Since the power constraints are S 0 2 ≤ P 0 and S 1 2 ≤ P 1 , the signals S 0 and S 1 can be regarded as independent, and the optimum signals S = {S 0 , S 1 } can be found by analyzing the derivative of the Bayes risk of the transmitter (which can be obtained by utilizing (10) in (6)) with respect to the signals:
for i ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the following cases hold:
< 0, thus the transmitter always chooses S i as maximum; i.e.,
, then S i has no effect on the Bayes risk of the transmitter.
> 0, thus the transmitter always chooses S i as minimum; i.e., S i = − √ P i . Now suppose that the receiver applies a simple threshold rule in a reverse order; i.e., δ : y
η. In this case, the following statements hold:
> 0, thus the transmitter always chooses S i as minimum; i.e.,
< 0, thus the transmitter always chooses S i as maximum; i.e., S i = √ P i .
By using the expressions above, the cases can be listed as follows:
1) τ ≤ 0 or τ = ∞ ⇒ The equilibrium is noninformative. 2) C η, then the transmitter chooses S 0 as minimum and S 1 as maximum; i.e., S 0 = − √ P 0 and S 1 = √ P 1 . Thus, it can be seen that S 0 < S 1 , which implies that the decision rule of the receiver is
, the consistency is established, and there exists an equilibrium. III: Nash equilibrium analysis for 0 < τ < ∞.
unique informative equilibrium non-informative equilibrium
non-informative equilibrium non-informative equilibrium non-informative equilibrium C t 01 < C t
11
P 0 > P 1 ⇒ unique informative equilibrium P 0 = P 1 ⇒ non-informative equilibrium P 0 < P 1 ⇒ no equilibrium non-informative equilibrium no equilibrium − √ P 1 . Thus, it can be seen that S 0 > S 1 , which implies that the decision rule of the receiver is
, the consistency is established, and there exists an equilibrium. 4) C . There-
, the consistency is established, and there exists an equilibrium. ii) if P 0 = P 1 ⇒ S 0 = S 1 , then the receiver applies δ : 1
H1 H0
τ . That is, the receiver chooses either always H 0 or always H 1 . Hence, there exists a non-informative equilibrium; i.e., the transmitter sends dummy signals, and the receiver makes a decision without considering transmitted signals. iii) if P 0 < P 1 ⇒ S 0 > S 1 , then the receiver ap- Then, the best responses of the transmitter and the receiver oscillate between cases 6.a) and 6.b) infinitely, which results in the absence of a Nash equilibrium.
The main reason for the absence of a non-informative (babbling) equilibrium under the Nash assumption is that in the binary signaling game setup, the receiver is forced to make a decision. Using only the prior information, the receiver always chooses one of the hypothesis. By knowing this, the encoder can manipulate his signaling strategy for his own benefit. However, after this manipulation, the receiver no longer keeps his decision rule the same; namely, the best response of the receiver alters based on the signaling strategy of the transmitter, which entails another change of the best response of the transmitter. Due to such an infinite recursion, there does not exist a pure Nash equilibrium.
After investigating the Nash equilibrium structure of the binary signaling game, the convergence properties of Nash and team setups can be analyzed as follows: Theorem 4.2: As the priors and the cost values from the perspective of the transmitter and the receiver converge to each other, the Nash solution does not necessarily converge to the team solution.
Proof: Assume that the priors and the cost values from the perspective of the transmitter converge to the those of the receiver; i.e., C 1 (C01−C11) ≤ 0 or τ = ∞, the equilibrium is non-informative. For the 0 < τ < ∞ case, if C 10 > C 00 and C 01 > C 11 , the equilibrium is informative; otherwise (C 10 < C 00 and C 01 < C 11 ), there exists no equilibrium. 2) Biased Transmitter Cost Function : If α > 1/2, the equilibrium is informative; if α = 1/2, the equilibrium is non-informative; otherwise; i.e., if α < 1/2, there exists no equilibrium. As it can be seen, the existence of the equilibrium depends on α = Pr(b = 0), the probability that the Bayes risks of the transmitter and the receiver are aligned.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver) have subjective priors and/or misaligned objective functions. Depending on the commitment nature of the transmitter to his policies, we formulated the binary signaling problem as a Bayesian game under either Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium concepts and established equilibrium solutions and their properties. We showed that there can be informative or non-informative equilibria in the binary signaling game under the Stackelberg assumption, but there always exists an equilibrium. However, apart from the informative and noninformative equilibria cases, there may not be a Nash equilibrium when the receiver is restricted to use deterministic policies. We also studied the robustness problem and showed that that as the inconsistency of the priors diminishes, the convergence to the team setup is attained for the Stackelberg case.
